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Abstract—A growing issue in the modern cyberspace world
is the direct identification of malicious activity over network
connections. The boom of the machine learning industry in the
past few years has led to the increasing usage of machine learn-
ing technologies, which are especially prevalent in the network
intrusion detection research community. When utilizing these
fairly contemporary techniques, the community has realized
that datasets are pivotal for identifying malicious packets
and connections, particularly ones associated with information
concerning labeling in order to construct learning models.
However, there exists a shortage of publicly available, relevant
datasets to researchers in the network intrusion detection com-
munity. Thus, in this paper, we introduce a method to construct
labeled flow data by combining the packet meta-information
with IDS logs to infer labels for intrusion detection research.
Specifically, we designed a NetFlow-compatible format due to
the capability of a a large body of network devices, such as
routers and switches, to export NetFlow records from raw
traffic. In doing so, the introduced method at hand would aid
researchers to access relevant network flow datasets along with
label information.
1. Introduction
With the growing intensity of cyber attacks, it is becom-
ing even more crucial to identify this malicious activity in
a timely manner. One such technique is scanning individual
packets for textual patterns (also known as ”signatures”) that
have been previously collected from other attack packets [1].
Although this idea is appealing due to its high detection
accuracy, its limitations cannot be ignored, namely various
encryption and privacy issues. Another approach in identify-
ing potential network intrusions is the use of machine learn-
ing that relies on statistical information without analyzing
internal payload [2]. Due to the rapid, modern development
of machine learning technologies, this alternative approach
has been widely accepted by the network intrusion detection
research community.
When applying this approach, datasets with associated
label information is crucial to not only identify malicious
packets and connections, but also to construct learning mod-
els. However, there is a lack of relevant, publicly available
datasets for researchers in the network detection intrusion
community. Thus, a substantial part of past network detec-
tion intrusion studies has only relied on a small number of
public data sets such as KDD Cup 1999 Data1 [3]. The KDD
Cup 1999 data was constructed by experts with substantial
domain knowledge, to provide necessary connection and
attack information (i.e., 41 attributes and the associated label
for each connection). While this dataset is still relevant to
this day in measuring initial performances of learning-based
detection models, it is arguable that the KDD Cup 1999 data
is outdated and ineffective in representing today’s network,
especially considering recent technological developments
with a wide variety of services and applications.
A critical part in creating datasets is the construction of
labels. Like the KDD Cup 1999 data, label construction is
often done by human experts, and is thus highly laborious
and expensive. Because of this, only few public datasets
have been published despite the growing importance of
intrusion detection research. In this paper, we introduce our
method to construct network flow data that would aid the
development of learning-based intrusion detection methods,
especially concerning that in a NetFlow-compatible format.
Our method combines the packet meta-information with
IDS logs to infer labels containing intrusion information
for individual flows. In this study, we analyze MAWILab
traces that provides IDS logs with the packet meta-data [4]
to generate labeled flow data.
The organization of the presentation is as follows. In
Section 2, we introduce three public datasets containing
label information for network intrusion detection research.
We then transition into a two-step process which generates
flow data and associated labels from the packet trace and
IDS log file in Section 3. Our summary thus concludes our
presentation in Section 4.
2. Public Datasets for Network Intrusion De-
tection
In this section, we provide a short summary of recently
collected public datasets, including the KDD Cup 1999
dataset.
1. http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html
KDD Cup 1999 dataset. The KDD Cup 1999
dataset contains 9-week TCP dump data collected from a
local area network in 1998. Each connection record con-
tains the basic features of TCP connection, such as login
failure, root access attempt, and others, as well as traffic
features including connection error rates. In total, there are
41 attributes from the three types of feature sets. Along
with these features, an associated label is provided that can
be classified in five categories: normal, DOS (denial-of-
service), R2L (unauthorized access from a remote machine),
U2R (unauthorized access to local root privileges), and
probing (surveillance and other probing). The KDD Cup
1999 dataset contains a significant number of repeated con-
nections, which may cause biased results when evaluating
intrusion detection methods. A modified version of this
dataset, known as NSL-KDD [5], reduces such repeated
connections to improve the data’s quality.
UNSW-NB15 dataset [6]. The UNSW-NB15 dataset
is a more recent dataset, as it was collected in 2015. A traffic
generator tool is configured on three servers; two of which
are for the normal spread of traffic and one of which for
malicious traffic. The routers in this configuration capture
packets and create pcap files. The Bro-IDS tool2 is utilized
to generate log files from captured pcap files, along with 49
features. The total number of records is over two millions
in four CSV files. This dataset also offers a training set and
testing set for evaluation purpose.
IDS 2017 dataset [7]. The testbed to collect data
includes two networks: one for attacks and the other for
victims. The captured dataset contains several different types
of attacks including DoS, Web attack, infiltration attack,
botnet attack, portscan, as well as background normal traffic
generated by using abstract behavior of 25 users based on
HTTP/HTTPS, FTP, SSH, and email protocols. The captured
data is five days long, from Monday, July 3, 2017 to Friday
July 7, 2017. The first day contains normal traffic only,
while the other days have malicious activities. The number
of records is over 2.8 millions with 85 features including
label information.
As seen above, all the datasets were constructed in simu-
lated environments with dedicated networks and servers, an
expensive and grueling task. In this work, we will demon-
strate how to construct datasets beneficial for intrusion
detection research from the packet meta-data and IDS logs,
without configuring expensive simulated environments.
3. Data generation from MAWILab traces
In this section, we introduce our method to generate flow
data with associated labels for network intrusion detection
research. The generation process consists of the following
two steps:
1) The first step extracts flow information from the
packet trace file (pcap);
2) The second step combines the IDS log data with
the flow data constructed in the first step using the
2. https://www.bro.org/
TABLE 1. MAWILAB IDS LOG COLUMNS
Column Description
sip Source IP address
dip Destination IP address
sport source port
dport destination port
taxonomy Category of anomalies (e.g., Port scan, DoS, etc)
heuristic Code assigned to anomalies
using the internal heuristic
distance Dn −Da,
Dn=distance to normal traffic,
Da=distance to anomalous traffic
nbDetectors Number of detectors reported this anomaly
label {anomalous, suspicious, notice}
four-tuple of flow information (source/destination
IP addresses and port numbers).
We first describe the overview of the MAWILab data,
and then present the data generation process in detail.
3.1. Description of MAWILab data
MAWILab provides a collection of network traffic traces
and IDS logs, captured from a backbone link in Japan
for about two decades up to now [8] [9]. The captured
traces contain the TCP/IP packet header information without
payloads in pcap files. One pcap file contains 15-minute data
on a single day. The traces are publicly available to access.3
In addition to the packet traces, it provides the IDS
logs [4]. The log contains the label information as well
as IP addresses and transport port numbers. The labels
then are inferred using a graph-based method that compares
and combines different and independent detection entities.
Table 1 shows the columns in the IDS log. The label has
three classes: anomalous is for a true anomaly, suspicious
indicates the traffic is highly likely to be anomalous, and
notice is assigned if some detectors reported the traffic as
an anomaly but it does not reach a consensus by the entire
detectors. In the current design, we only consider anomalous
and suspicious in our method.
3.2. First step: generating flow data
We construct network flow data from MAWILab packet
traces using SiLK4. To briefly summarize, SiLK (System for
Internet-Level Knowledge) is a collection of traffic analysis
tools developed to facilitate network traffic analysis. Using
this tool, it is possible to extract the flow information from
TCP dump files in question. Note that the output in this step
will be combined with the IDS log data to generate the label
information in the second step.
To obtain the flow information, we use the following two
commands in SiLK: rwptoflow generates flow records
from the given packet data, and rwcut displays the selected
3. http://mawi.wide.ad.jp/mawi/
4. https://tools.netsa.cert.org/silk/
fields from the SiLK flow records. The following shows how
to extract the flow information from the packet trace using
rwptoflow and rwcut.
> rwptoflow path --flow-out=filename.rw
> rwcut path --fields=fieldsList
--output-path=filename.data
Here, “path” is the directory that the output file is stored,
and “filename” is the output file name. For the --fields
option, “fieldsList” specifies a list of the fields saved in
the output file. The list of the entire fields available can be
found from: https://tools.netsa.cert.org/silk/rwcut.html. Note
that rwstats can be alternatively used instead of rwcut,
which makes a summary output and reorders the entries (in
contrast, rwcut preserves the output order).
Here is an example. We downloaded a pcap file of
“201807011400.pcap.gz” (1426.45 MB) from the trace
repository.5 Then, the following commands are executed
to obtain the flow data from the given trace. In this ex-
ample, the resulted flow data is written to a file named
“20180701 result.data”.
> rwptoflow 201807011400.pcap
--flow-out=20180701.rw
> rwcut 20180701.rw
--fields=1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,
11,12,13,14,15,20,21,25,26,27,28,29
--output-path=20180701_result.data
3.3. Second step: combining flow data with IDS
logs
To generate labeled flow data, the next step is to merge
the output resulted from the first step with the associated
IDS logs (i.e., the same-day logs as the traffic trace used in
step 1). MAWILab provides two log files for a single day
traffic trace: one with a suffix of ‘anomalous suspicious’
containing the log records with the labels of anomalous and
suspicious, and the other with a suffix of ‘notice’ keeping the
records with the label of notice. Again, we do not consider
the label of notice since only a few detectors assumed the
activity as an anomaly without making a full consent by the
entire set of detectors.
To combine, we utilize the four flow attributes of {source
IP address, source port, destination IP address, destination
port}, which are available in both of the flow data file and
the IDS log file. For each entry in the log file, we search the
flow records with the identical values for the above attributes
in the flow data file. A flow record is labeled as anomaly in
case of matching.
It is possible that a log entry contains one or more
null values for certain flow attributes. Here are two
example log entries: R1:(sip=A, sport=B, dip=C,
dport=D) and R2:(sip=A, sport=null, dip=C,
dport=null). In this example, R2 contains null values
for sport and dport, while R1 specifies the entire flow
attributes without a null. For the exposition purpose, we
5. http://mawi.wide.ad.jp/mawi/samplepoint-F/2018/201807011400.html
define L as the number of flow attributes available (i.e.,
not null) in the log entry. Intuitively, the log entry with
a higher L value is more specific. Due to this reason, we
give a higher precedence to a log entry with a higher L.
Thus, R1 has a greater precedence than R1; that is, R1
> R2 as L(R1) > L(R2). Suppose a flow F1:(sip=A,
sport=B, dip=C, dport=D). It shows an example of
multiple match since F1 matches both R1 and R2. In that
case, F1 is combined with R1 by the precedence rule.
Rarely, there can be multiple matches for a single flow
by multiple log entries with the same L. To see this,
suppose F2:(sip=P, sport=Q, dip=R, dport=S),
R3:(sip=P, dip=R), and R4:(dip=R, dport=S).
In this case, F2 matches both of R3 and R4 with L=2. To
take this into account, we apply a simple heuristic: (1) give
a higher weight to victim than source (i.e., destination >
source, and (2) give a higher weight to host than service
(i.e., IP address > port number), and hence (dip > sip
> dport > sport) for the identical L. By this rule, F2
is combined with R3 instead of R4.
From IDS logs, we observed several IDS entries with
L=1; that is, only a single attribute is available and the
other three are null. For example, one entry in the IDS
log contains (sip=null, sport=443, dip=null,
dport=null). We also observed that there are about 16
million flows only matching with this record out of 68
million flows on that day (i.e., 23.5%). The port number
443 is widely used for secure web browser communication,
and response packets from web servers communicating over
TLS/SSL often have this port number. We feel that it is
somewhat risky to label such a large number of flows as
anomaly. Due to this reason, we label the flows matching
more than one attribute (i.e., L > 1) as anomaly, while
we label the flows matching only one attribute (L = 1) as
unsure. Any flow with no match is labeled as normal. The
flow records labeled as unsure can be excluded by the users
based on their discretion.
Table 2 shows the output format after combining. The
feature of “class” is the new label created in the combining
process, while the feature of “label” shows the MAWILab-
defined label information. The table also shows how the
features in the output are associated with the fields defined
in NetFlow v9.
We implemented this combining process using Python.
A Python program flowlabeling.py takes a flow data
file (resulted in step 1) and an IDS log file, and pro-
duces a set of combined flows formatted in Table 2. An-
other Python program flowsplitter.py breaks the
outputs into multiple files with designated time windows.
For example, it splits a 15-minute flow data into 180
sub-files under the assumption of 5-second time window.
The programs are available from the following repository:
https://github.com/dcstamuc/FlowDataGen.
4. Summary
This paper introduced a method to construct network
flow data that would aid the development of learning-
TABLE 2. FLOW FEATURES RESULTED FROM THE COMBINING PROCESS
Feature NetFlow v9 field Description
sIP IPV4 SRC ADDR Source IP address
dIP IPV4 DST ADDR Dest IP address
sPort L4 SRC PORT Source port
dPort L4 DST PORT Dest port
proto PROTOCOL IP protocol
packets IN BYTES Packet count
bytes IN PKTS Byte count
flags TCP FLAGS Bit-wise or of TCP flags over all packets
sTime UNIX Seconds Starting time of flow (in sec)
durat Duration of flow (in sec)
eTime End time of flow (in sec)
sen FLOW SAMPLER ID Name or ID of the sensor
in SRC VLAN Router SNMP input interface
out DST VLAN Router SNMP output interface
nhIP IPV4 NEXT HOP Router next hop ID
senClass Class of sensor that collected flow (SiLK-specific)
typeFlow Type of flow for this sensor class (SiLK-specific)
iType ICMP TYPE ICMP type value for ICMP flows
iCode ICMP code value
initialF TCP flags on first packet in flow
sessionF Bit-wise OR of TCP flags over all packets except the first in the flow
attribut Flow attributes set by the flow generator
appli Guess as to the content of the flow
class {normal, anomaly, unsure} for anomaly detection
taxonomy Category of anomalies (e.g., Port scan, DoS, etc)
label {normal, anomalous, suspicious, notice} (MAWILab-specific)
heuristic Code assigned to anomalies (MAWILab-specific)
distance Dn −Da (MAWILab-specific)
nbDetectors Number of detectors reported this anomaly (MAWILab-specific)
based intrusion detection methods. Our method combines
the packet meta-information with the IDS logs to infer la-
bels containing intrusion information for individual network
flows. To achieve this goal, we utilized the SiLK tool to
extract the flow data from the TCP dump file, and imple-
mented a Python program to combine the flow data with the
IDS log. The generated flow data contains associated label
information for intrusion detection research and is NetFlow
compatible. We believe the introduced method would assist
researchers in network intrusion detection to access recent
network flow datasets with associated labels.
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